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Abstract 
 
JESSICA BUTCHER: Conflict within Sudanese and South Sudanese Diasporas:  
Outlining the nature and impacts of conflict and assessing existing educational responses 
(Under the direction of Dr. James L. Peacock and Dr. Xue Lan Rong) 
 
Conflict within the Greater Sudanese diaspora remains, and is exacerbated, in the 
resettlement process. Conflict derives from historical or current homeland issues such as identity or 
political cleavages. Conflict also emerges in the process of migration and acculturative stress. This 
has intergenerational and gender factors, and develops in reaction to the changing dynamics of a 
community ‘in exile’. Finally, conflict occurs as a result of interaction with the society of the 
resettlement country, including elevation of certain groups or individuals within the diaspora, be they 
ethnic, religious, gender or otherwise distinct. Formal education offers opportunities for conflict 
transformation in this resettlement context, through differing means and outcomes. Peace Education 
offers a deliberate, individualized approach to reframing conflict and peace. Vocational education 
offers structural inclusion through employment, a status demonstrated to decrease hostilities. 
Community Development Programming offers greater social inclusion, re-framing education for peace 
from an individual to a collective endeavor. 
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Introduction 
The Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas1 are diverse, displaying a myriad of identities, 
narratives and migration experiences. Sudan has long been a significant contributor to refugee 
movement globally (Tempany, 2009), with increasingly high profile conflicts waged at times in 
combination with each other, and at others in isolation in geographically and ethnically diverse 
regions of the now newly divided land.  
Sudan is one of the largest countries in Africa, housing hundreds of tribes and dialects, and 
multiple religions (Richmond & Gestrin, 1998 in Tempany, 2009). Identity, as ethnicity, is not static, 
but instead a messy and fluid construct (Hatoss, 2012), and members of these varying and constantly 
evolving groups now find themselves part of the diaspora – a group that at once attempts to create 
new community, whilst maintaining the old, forging and sustaining complex social relations within and 
between their countries of origin and residence (Lim, 2009). This transnational involvement of 
refugees has been studied in relation to economic, and to a lesser extent social, remittances, as has 
the sometimes uneasy relationship between refugees and their new host communities. Very little 
attention has, however, been directed toward the often significant ongoing conflict within diaspora 
communities: how this is perpetuated, and its implications for the diaspora, as well as communities in 
the countries of origin and residence.  
This conflict is significant in diaspora life as an ensuing lack of communal trust frames 
ongoing relationships; can add to the already significant stress of resettlement; influences the way 
that children are taught about culture, history and other ethnicities or religions; alters the way that 
people in the residence country perceive the origin nation and conflicts; and can ultimately lead to a 
perpetuation of armed conflict. This paper will thus explore and discuss the level and nature of 
conflicts that exists within Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas, as well as the implications of 
this conflict for the diaspora and to a lesser extent the countries of origin and residence. Finally, 
educational opportunities for assisting the diaspora to transform and decrease conflict ‘in exile’ will be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Both nations’ diasporas, and their separate and combined multiplicity of ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups are 
encompassed in this discussion, and will sometimes be referred to collectively as ‘Greater Sudanese’. This is due to the 
complexity of identities involved that are not always geographically or ethnically oriented, and methodological difficulties as 
most refugees discussed left Sudan before official division of Sudan and South Sudan. It is not in any way a political statement, 
or intended to undermine the diversity of statehoods, or desired statehoods, involved, but rather a way of categorizing a 
diverse region and diverse diaspora.	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acknowledged and assessed, focusing on three broad models. Each model approaches diaspora 
conflict from a differing perspective, and endeavors to generate transformation through differing 
outcomes.  
The first of these is the individual approach, with its intention to alter and broaden individual 
attitudes through the broad field of Peace Education. This differs from the second field, which aims to 
decrease conflict through diminishing systemic alienation of refugees through Vocational Education. 
The third area is the adult education model of Community Development Programs, which seek to 
address social alienation in order to generate more peaceful interactions. Discussion will focus 
particularly on identity conflict, alongside which other contributing factors will be presented and 
considered, drawing on research from resettlement contexts of Australia, North America and the 
European Union. Through these analyses, the most appropriate and effective role for education in 
this dispersed diaspora context will be sought and discussed.  
 
Methodology 
 This research utilizes archival resources and a combination of data gathered through studies 
in Australia, the European Union and North America. Conflict dynamics and diaspora needs 
acknowledged in previous research, drawing from studies in social psychology, education, 
economics, conflict, and migration, will be assessed. Educational possibilities and conflict theory in 
the areas of individualized peace education, structural inclusion through employment, and social 
inclusion through community development programming will also be presented and analyzed. This 
thesis contributes to this field of academia through the application of diverse theoretical and practical 
frameworks, drawing together commonalities and differences in existing data, and analyzing 
educational opportunities for peace-building in the diaspora. 
 
Conflict in the Diaspora 
 The Greater Sudanese diaspora is subject to conflict, and its exacerbators, above and 
beyond the experience of many other communities as it concurrently navigates three kinds of conflict. 
The first area of conflict is that which occurs due to historical or current issues in the homeland. This 
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is the conflict that has generated migration and might include cleavages that are identity, resource or 
political in nature. The second form is that which occurs within the diaspora, due to the process of 
migration and resettlement, and acculturative stress. Such conflict may have intergenerational 
factors, relate to gender norms, and develop in reaction to the changing dynamics of a community ‘in 
exile’. The third area is that conflict which occurs due to interaction with the society of the 
resettlement country, creating additional stresses, and potentially decreasing diaspora cohesion 
through discriminatory practices. This area of conflict is highly context-specific, and may include 
societal recognition of certain refugee narratives over others, or elevation of certain groups or 
individuals within the diaspora to leadership positions, inciting resentment from the remainder of the 
community and reinforcing divides. It might also relate to religious adherence, as resettlement 
countries in the West become increasingly rejecting of Islam, for example, increasing resettlement 
difficulties for one group within the diaspora over those experienced by others. 
 
Refugee Experience 
 In 2008, at least 3.8 million people were believed to belong to the resettled global African 
diaspora, with the majority living in North America and Europe (Mohamoud & Osman, 2008). Greater 
Sudan is a large contributor to this, with large refugee-based diaspora populations throughout the 
world. The process of forced migration is one of inevitable distress, and difficulties in resettlement and 
the loss of social and cultural networks add significantly to the post-traumatic stress experienced by 
many (Khawaja & White et al 2008). As nationalism may prosper from the major dislocations and 
disruptions brought about by international migration (Conversi, 2012), diasporas can experience a 
heightened emotional connection with their homeland as their life becomes increasingly disjointed. 
This encourages some to lobby, or take a position in relation to development of their country of origin, 
and for others it increases financial involvement with remittances sent in many cases to sustain or 
enhance the livelihood of family, friends, or affiliated organizations, or, in other cases, to support 
armed groups in pursuing ongoing violent conflict (Vorrath, 2012). It can lead to reinforcement or 
development of nationalist or ethnocentric sentiment, as people differentiate between themselves and 
the ‘other’, framing the latter in an adversarial light.  
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 Sumner (1906) coined the term of ‘ethnocentrism’, distinguishing between the ‘ingroup’ and 
‘outgroup’ and associated intergroup dynamics that dictate group formation and competition (in Tajfel, 
1982). This theory places ones own group in the central role of superiority, and uses it as a reference 
point for all other groups that are, through such a lens, of course inferior. While the theory and notion 
of ethnocentrism is commonly accepted, a study of 186 preindustrial societies found that in many 
cases, indeed 75 per cent, the degree of internal warfare was positively correlated with hostility 
toward out-groups, meaning that conflict with external groups is often paired with conflict internally, 
somewhat contradicting Sumner’s theory of in-group and out-group dynamics (Pettigrew, 2007) and 
demonstrating the complexity of identity dynamics in conflict. Indeed, Sumner’s theory has been 
challenged in the acutely context-sensitive of conflict, as out-group stereotyping and social distance 
vary along with differences emphasized (Brewer, 1981 in Tajfel, 1982). Without explicit reference to 
ethnicity, a professional respondent in Westoby’s (2009) study of Greater Sudanese in Queensland, 
Australia, echoed the fluid and emergent nature of conflict dynamics in the diaspora, stating: 
In my observation, to begin with people arrive here and are glad to be alive and they are also 
glad to find other survivors – there is an initial euphoria. But then there is depression – 
primarily due to survivor’s guilt, and the temptation is to either blame themselves or blame 
others. As others arrive, if these deeper issues are not resolved, people break into factions 
and everything then depends on how people work out those conflicts. (Professional interview 
8, Westoby, 2009 p.63) 
 
This statement demonstrates how this complex inter-group conflict dynamic within the diaspora may 
thus be further exacerbated and manipulated by the trauma suffered by refugees throughout the 
migration process, as past grievances can fuel the perpetuation of ongoing animosities in the 
resettlement context. 
The refugee experience of adopting and adjusting to a new country of residence is invariably 
traumatic, and most quantitative studies have found high rates of PTSD and depression. Often this is 
assumed to relate primarily to those conflict experiences individuals have survived prior to 
resettlement, however, resettled Greater Sudanese refugees themselves often report more concern 
with current stressors such as family problems than with past trauma (Tempany, 2009). This indicates 
the powerful role of the communities of the host country in the migration experience, be they 
indigenous host communities or existing Sudanese diaspora. The new context provides important 
support possibilities, and also challenges in the form of altered cultural norms and often prejudice. 
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Migrant responses to stereotyping often reify ‘traditional’ practices symbolizing their homeland 
culture, particularly those related to gender roles and morality (Cohen 1969; Smith-Hefner 1999; 
Golomb 1978, in Fábos, 2012). This is not so for all migrants, however, as many attempt to 
concurrently navigate practices and frameworks of both communities, to differing degrees. This 
difference of acculturation can, and does, provoke further cultural conflict within the diaspora in a 
myriad of ways.  
 
Identity conflict 
 Refugees are often defined by their insecurity, with little regard for their identity, context and 
life prior to conflict, nor the nature or potential of their participation in society post-conflict (Ekblad et 
al, 2004). Popular thinking in the west often equates common skin color with an assumed common 
African behavior, language, attitudes and capabilities (Ndhlovu, 2009). In the case of the Greater 
Sudanese diaspora, the geographically, linguistically and ethnically diverse community bases identity 
on a variety of things that are in constant flux, and represents more than simply a choice of the home 
or the host country, rather more closely linked with common ideologies and power dynamics 
(Blackledge, 2005; Gal, 2006, in Hatoss, 2012). The individual’s membership and role within the 
group is highly relevant to this identity in conflict, as Sherif and Sherif (1953, 1961) found that 
individual behavior in conflict is more dictated by the role of the group in intergroup competition than 
any pre-existing personal relationships that may have existed between groups prior to hostilities (in 
Tajfel, 1982). Collective identity is also highly relevant to this discussion, as groups have been found 
to demonstrate higher level of aggression or retaliation than individuals in some conditions (Tajfel, 
1982), meaning that once conflicts become polarized along group lines, as opposed to individual, the 
intensity of conflict may be much more significant. Given the diversity of identity groups present in the 
Greater Sudanese diaspora, particularly those that are ethnically associated, this group element of 
conflict is of high relevance. 
The Greater Sudanese diaspora has experienced significant ethnically aligned cleavages, as 
outlined by Moro (2004) in case studies from Uganda and Egypt. Some instances of conflict have 
been based on historical tension, such as that between the Dinka and Nuer in diaspora. However, 
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conflict can also be related to current homeland affairs as was the case with street violence between 
refugees from these two ethnic groups in Cairo. This physical conflict was stimulated by reported 
atrocities committed in South Sudan by members of the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which is often associated with Dinka ethnicity because of its leadership. 
As a result, abuses committed by these soldiers have often been attributed to Dinka people, building 
on existing resentment towards this ethnic group due to its dominant size and thus relative power in 
parts of southern Sudan (Moro, 2004). While in the homeland, ethnic dominance may be a source of 
privilege, once in exile this can have the converse impact of increasing the vulnerability to this ethnic 
group as they find themselves subject to historical and current resentments in the transient refugee 
context of insecurity.  
Historical and current intergroup power differences in this way emerge into relevance in the 
diaspora. The Dinka experience exemplifies this well, as the largest ethnic group in South Sudan, and 
seemingly used to associated privilege, noted by refugee camp administrators in Uganda (Moro, 
2004). This led to certain expectations on their part, due to their numeric and thus cultural 
significance, that were not met when they found themselves a relatively insignificant minority in some 
parts of the diaspora. Other ethnic groups, used to being the minority yet now finding themselves 
much more significant in numbers, harbored resentment that was exacerbated by current events such 
as those prompting violence in Cairo, as well as historical frustrations that were now able to be 
expressed in the altered power dynamic of the diaspora.  
The Dinka have thus experienced many problems with other ethnic groups, and at times have 
been individually targeted in retaliation. Administrators of refugee camps also bring their own 
narratives and experiences to the dynamic, in some cases also displaying anti-Dinka sentiment 
(Moro, 2004). The result of this in Adjumani camp, Uganda, was that the Dinka were separated from 
the rest of the refugee population, and denied permanent resettlement with other refugees (Moro, 
2004). The changing power dynamics associated with demographic shifts, in the context of current 
and historical tensions, are thus significant in the life of the diaspora. These dynamics, exemplified in 
these neighboring countries, form the initial experiences of the Greater Sudanese diaspora and likely 
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impact the development of their collective narrative in exile. A Sudanese interview participant in 
Australia referred to the ongoing dynamic of tribalism and its importance in resettlement, stating: 
In Africa, the educated people encouraged tribalism. This is the only way they can get into 
power – when the tribe is behind you. So when you come here, and struggle, some still have 
this in mind. (Participant interview 3, Westoby, 2009 p.63) 
 
Such tribal or ethnic conflict is not unique to the Dinka. In Uganda, refugees from the Madi 
and Kuku ethnic groups, both from Sudan, descended into conflict as resource allocation and 
competition increased, despite these ethnic groups having experienced positive relations in Sudan 
(Moro, 2004). Resources became central to this conflict – beyond the basics of existence, as power 
resources became newly contested and sought after. The two groups combined accounted for almost 
80% of refugees at the Adjumani camp. As the dominant ethnic groups in the camp, these groups 
competed for NGO jobs, educational opportunities, basic resources and influence (Moro,2004). In 
Sudan, they weren’t in competition, and even supported each other against the perceived domination 
by larger groups, especially Dinka. They had never directly competed for resources previously, but in 
the camp environment they emerged as competitors. When violence erupted, other ethnic groups 
were then also drawn into the conflict based on historical grievances and competition, for example the 
Lotuho ethnic group which then sided with the Kuku based on former allegiance, against the Madi - 
their historical resource rivals (Moro, 2004).  
Again, unaddressed historical grievances emerge in current conflicts, increasing the 
complexity of these group interaction dynamics. Importantly, the UNHCR response to this conflict, as 
with the Dinka, was to separate the two dominant competing ethnic groups, creating camps, and thus 
temporary territories, that were almost entirely Kuku or Madi (Moro, 2004). Given these examples of 
the re-emergence of unaddressed ethnic conflict in the Greater Sudanese diaspora, questions could 
be asked about the flow on impact of this segregation in subsequent resettlement as these groups 
were not reconciled and rivalries were allowed to remain.  
Relationships with the host country, and in temporary settlement, can also generate conflict, 
as one ethnic or identity group might enjoy very differing conditions to another. In Egypt, a transit 
country for many Sudanese and South Sudanese, many northern Sudanese have family and cultural 
ties to the local population. Most southern Sudanese, by comparison, 
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This has negatively impacted their ability to settle and gain inclusion in Cairo (Moro, 2004). Local 
communities and authorities further exacerbate this difference, with intimidation, violence and arrests 
of African Sudanese, as opposed to Arab Sudanese, including both undocumented and UNHCR-
registered (Moro, 2004).  
In Cairo, as elsewhere in the diaspora, Sudanese cultural events have proven powerful 
demonstrations of the cleavages between ethnic groups in diaspora. In some places football has 
been the litmus test, but in Cairo it was the Sudanese Cultural Festival of 1996. Some ethnic groups 
split, as some members opposed participation in an ‘Arab’ event, while others rejected the inclusion 
of ethnic groups that are present in, though not indigenous to, South Sudan such as the Nubi. (Moro, 
2004)  
Both the Egyptian and Ugandan diaspora examples share the commonality of geographic 
proximity to Sudan. The issues faced, however, are not unique to those exiled to surrounding 
countries. Westoby’s (2009) study found a similar situation in Australia, though with differing 
manifestation of ethnic cleavages. He quotes a South Sudanese community leader saying: 
‘The politics of Southern Sudan has a significant impact here on the community. Smaller 
tribes tend not to co-operate with the larger tribes. They are afraid of being dominated. 
Significant parts of this are attitudes towards the Niolitics tribes. These are the tribes linked 
geographically to the Nile – Nuer, Dinka, Luo, Chiluk and Anyuak. They are major tribes that 
have also spread, but their origins are along the Nile. They are tall and dark. 
  
Other tribes – the largest non-Niolitic tribe is the Zanda, in Western Equatoria, of the Bantu 
race – they and other smaller tribes that join the Zanda, often do not cooperate. The Bari-
speaking tribes have also historically annexed themselves to the Zanda.  
 
In Brisbane, many of the leadership issues, struggles and conflicts are still built around these 
historical conflicts. It is hard to break down the barriers between Niolitic and 
Zanda/Bantu/Bari people.’ (Participant Interview 6, Westoby, 2009 pp.62-3) 
 
Complexity is added to this discussion of identity conflict as persisting ethnic identities can be 
heightened not only in response to differences, but also pervasive similarities (Conversi, 2012). This 
is an important recognition, as conflict within the diaspora may not always be related to profoundly 
differing narratives, but may rather also include competition or differing views between those with very 
similar narratives, or in reaction to external societal perceptions of the universal commonality of 
‘Sudaneseness’. Whether in response to difference or similarity, as a general rule, ‘exiled’ individuals 
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tend to feel strongly linked to a symbolically valuable territory (Vorrath, 2012), heightening the 
emotional plain at which diasporas interact with regard to their homeland.  
This interaction with the homeland, whether emotional, financial, political or social, is a key 
opportunity to express and reinforce identities. Obligation can be a guiding force, as individuals feel a 
duty to positively impact the homeland situation given their newfound safety or security. Ethnic 
affinities and group identification as discussed above can also generate sympathy or feelings of guilt 
toward conflicting groups, or allow people to harbor grievance much longer than homeland residents 
(Bigombe et al. 2000, in Brinkerhoff, 2009), enabling the continuation of conflict in the homeland, or 
the diaspora, or likely both as presented here. Identity is thus key to any discussion of diaspora, and 
especially in the case of the Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas an analysis of this dynamic is 
required to assess levels of conflict and ways to overcome this. 
 
Diversity of experience 
 Diaspora groups comprise fundamentally diverse actors and sub-groups beyond and 
intersecting with ethnic lines, including governments-in-exile, political opposition figures, armed 
groups, advocacy groups – every actor in a conflict can be present in the diaspora. The Sudanese 
and South Sudanese diasporas are incredibly diverse in identity, as already explored. This identity is 
based on many aspects of life, and is impacted by each individual’s story and personality. Just as 
experience of violence might radicalize one, it may prompt another to promote peace (Vorrath, 2012). 
It is thus impossible to predetermine the impact of a particular event on a population, and the varying 
responses can lead to deeply held, and deeply divergent, beliefs. Beyond this, each armed conflict 
within Sudan and South Sudan, in each geographical and social context, is different in nature, leading 
to fundamentally different experiences (Vorrath, 2012).   
 Furthermore, the time at which individuals left their homeland, or arrived in their country of 
resettlement, and the path that they made all combine to impact their experience of migration, conflict 
and life. These experiences have the potential to create conflict in the diaspora, especially when one 
type of experience gains more ‘cultural value’ than another, skewing representation of the community 
as demonstrated by Sudanese community members in conversation with the United States Institute 
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of Peace, discussed below (USIP, 2010). This diversity of experience and recognition in the refugee 
context encourages a complex web of distrust between individuals. Westoby (2009) presents a South 
Sudanese community leader’s perspective on the issue of trust between such diverse groups in the 
diaspora, stating: 
We seem to have come here with a culture of mistrust that sometimes makes it hard for us to 
build community – it is deeply distressing to see these patterns of mistrust constantly 
undermining some of our efforts. (Participant interview 7, Westoby, 2009 p.67) 
 
 Such distrust cannot be dismissed as unfounded paranoia, as former armed combatants and 
officers are known to be part of the South Sudanese diaspora context in Australia (Westoby, 2009).  
 Despite this, ‘Sudaneseness’, or ‘South Sudaneseness’ can be experienced in diverse ways 
that are both divergent and also fundamentally cohesive (Fábos, 2012). Adding to concerns about the 
consequences of its fracturing, Westoby (2009) found community to be fundamental to South 
Sudanese sense of wellbeing, both to ‘stick together’ through their resettlement hardship, and in 
following traditional community frameworks of living. Building on Sumner’s theory of ethnocentrism, 
the body of evidence to suggest that external conflict increases intra-group cohesion appears 
somewhat dependent on conditions. Stein (1976) found that if the external conflict invokes threat that 
affects all group members equally and indiscriminately, involves a possible solution, and the group 
has the capacity to care for and support its membership, increased cohesion is likely (in Tajfel, 1982). 
In the case of the Greater Sudanese diaspora in Australia, there is thus tension between the factors 
exacerbating conflict and the need for community for personal wellbeing. In this context, the lack of 
uniform in-group experience and a lack of capacity to support group members might account for the 
fracturing of this group that is so fundamental to coping strategies – even in the face of societal 
discrimination and injustice. 
 
Diaspora Representation 
 Where internal conflict exists, communal assessment and engagement can be problematized 
by a proliferation of self-appointed leaders and ‘warlords’, exploiting tense ethnic, religious and 
emotional allegiances (Neumann & Emmer, 2012). To make use of Galtung’s (1971) conflict modeling 
in reference to the resettled diaspora, essentially the host society as a whole can be viewed as a 
	  	   11	  
center point, within which there is a power center and a power periphery. This then relates to the 
Sudanese diaspora within it as the periphery, with this peripheral power again hosting its own center 
and periphery. The Sudanese diaspora can in this way be viewed as a center periphery structure, 
relating to the host and origin communities as such. This is helpful in understanding conflict in the 
diaspora especially as it relates to interaction with the host community, and flow-on intra-diaspora 
impacts.  
 As Galtung (1971) theorizes, the two ‘centers’ interact, to their mutual, though not always 
even, benefit. It is not desirable to either center that the two peripheries interact. These peripheries 
are the less engaged actors, with very limited mutual awareness. Through this construct, many 
aspects of conflict within the diaspora can be analyzed. Differing actors can be cast in the role of the 
‘power center’, engaging with a potentially shifting ‘center’ of the periphery, dependent on the specific 
situation. For example, the homeland: in this case the Sudanese or South Sudanese government 
may be the power center interacting with the power center of the diaspora, which will be positioned as 
such due to political concerns and allegiances. The same example could be given for the host country 
government, seeking aligned individuals within the diaspora in their society’s midst. These political 
concerns can cause great issues within the diaspora as the external search for leadership of the 
diaspora seeks to satisfy the external desire for an internal ally – someone to speak for the diaspora 
as a whole. Such leadership is often not organically forthcoming due to social fracturing, and such 
center periphery power dynamics may influence the choice of who to support in their leadership, as 
lamented by members of the Darfurian diaspora in conversation with the United States Institute for 
Peace (USIP, 2010). 
 Galtung’s construct is also useful in assessing the often unanticipated negative outcomes of 
the well-meaning, perhaps NGO, community wanting to develop capacity of the diaspora through 
leadership training and giving voice to this disempowered community, without recognizing its deeply 
fractured nature. This can result in reinforcement of the power center, effectively increasing the 
division between diaspora center and periphery through knowledge and skills. What might be 
intended to empower the diaspora community may thus result in a perpetuation of conflict within the 
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diaspora, as evidenced by the selection of English-speaking males to lead UNHCR Peace Education 
programs in Kenya, as discussed later. 
 Research has found that competition between groups based on scarcity can be extended in 
intergroup dynamics to those goods that have no value outside the contest itself – such as status, 
power or prestige (Turner, 1975 in Tajfel, 1982). Thus in the case of the Greater Sudanese diaspora, 
these elements are able to occupy significant space in the quest for social and political recognition 
from a perspective of communal and individual disempowerment, as demonstrated in the Kuku-Madi 
conflict in Uganda.  
Diaspora representation is a delicate area in this context of diverse identities, acculturation 
levels and experience. It is nonetheless an important issue, as western governments and NGOs 
collaborate with, or are lobbied by, diaspora leaders for both homeland and residence country affairs 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006). Establishing legitimate leadership in a context where gender, 
generational, identity, and other roles are contested is extremely difficult. In 2008 and 2010 the United 
States Institute of Peace convened selected members of the Darfurian diaspora to discuss issues 
related to the conflict situation in Darfur. Those present recommended that greater care be taken by 
the United States and United Nations in selecting truly representative and independent individuals 
and civil society organizations to participate as consultants to the peace process (USIP, 2010). Their 
discussion also demonstrated the lack of cohesion within even this smaller sub-group of the diaspora, 
as they disagreed on fundamentals of roles and representation whilst criticizing diaspora 
fragmentation and the maintained affiliation of some with particular armed movements (USIP, 2010). 
The group also noted skewed external support in Darfur, as older Darfurian organizations led by 
traditional leaders were not gaining the same support from international NGOs as newer 
organizations led by a younger generation and women, displaying the potential negative impact of 
external agendas, even when intended to empower (USIP, 2010).  
In a context that usually presumes some positive level of social remittances, especially 
around democracy, it is somewhat problematic that the diaspora advocate democracy in their 
countries of origin, when there are questions about how representative the diaspora leadership is of 
the wider group of migrants and refugees that they themselves claim to represent (Ostergaard-
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Nielsen, 2006). This is an area of diaspora conflict significantly impacted by external actors, be they 
home or host country governments, societies, or international actors. 
 
Gender conflict 
An additional exacerbating factor in diaspora conflict emergence and perpetuation is gender. 
The disruption of forced migration usually means loss or restriction of family and community relations, 
physical displacement, cultural dislocation and restricted opportunities for self-determination (Ager, 
1999; Deng et al., 2005; Marfleet, 2006, in Marlowe, 2012). This can significantly impact culturally 
based gender roles and associated self-perception of diaspora members. A common challenge for 
Greater Sudanese diaspora men is the changed family dynamic in their new country of residence, 
where social norms and economic realities often dictate that fathers are expected to care for their 
children, alongside mothers. Even when there is cultural resistance from the mother, father or both, 
without traditionally supportive communal constructs for child rearing, fathers’ involvement in this 
aspect of family life is simply a practical necessity (Marlowe, 2012). With the new cultural and 
contextual norms of diaspora life, the public role of Greater Sudanese women has also been 
significantly altered, as younger women challenge the old leadership, bridge secular and religious 
organizations, protest war and violence and establish themselves as theorists and activists (Lim, 
2009).  
Westoby (2009) conducted extensive research into the sociality of healing for South 
Sudanese refugees in Queensland, Australia. He quotes research participants’ responses regarding 
the social trauma of family disintegration and changing gender norms.  
‘Women’s economic independence is very threatening. Even with peace coming to Sudan, 
many men are worried that if they want to go home and help in Sudan the wives will not 
come. This freedom for the women is a real problem in our African context. It is complex and 
linked to traditions – for example, if there is a divorce in Sudan the children go to the men and 
of course it is different here. Here a major source of conflict is that when a woman leaves a 
man it is always assumed that another man is involved. Then violence can erupt. Also, there 
are simple misunderstandings within Australia people: for example, when I Sudanese man 
says, “I am going to kill [referring to wife]”, he does not mean it – it is only an expression. “I 
am going to beat [referring to a child]” is also only an expression. We are like the Italians – 
we express ourselves emotionally. But people here take it literally.’ (Participant Interview 6, 
Westoby, 2009 p.60) 
 
Another interviewee is quoted saying:  
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“A big [issue] is women – back home they might be a doctor or a teacher, but they recognize 
their place. The role of the husband is clear and strong. Here the role of the man is reducing. 
Some women become radical in this situation and it causes much distress.” (Participant 
Interview 5, Westoby, 2009 p.60) 
 
This gender challenge is a great source, and exacerbator, of conflict within the diaspora, both 
at a family and community level as new gender norms threaten established identities and attempt to 
push forth new manners of interaction. Many within the dominant host culture might also be unaware 
of the extreme cultural involvement in the formation of gender roles, leading to a lack of self-reflection 
and awareness when approaching this emotive subject in a multicultural context, and a tendency for 
condemnation of differing norms. Poppitt & Frey (2007) note the somewhat invisibility of diaspora 
gender conflict from the host society’s perspective, as Sudanese immigrants are aware of host culture 
disapproval of cultural practices with particular sensitivity to this divergent area of gender. Sudanese 
girls in Australia have also been found to have greater acculturative stress than boys, as they 
navigate dual cultural expectations that are further diverged than those of their brothers (Poppitt & 
Frey, 2007).  
Gender conflict is immensely important individually and communally, and could easily warrant 
the entire focus of this discussion. However, in retaining the key focus of this discussion on identity 
conflict, gender will be considered only as a contributing factor and thus not explored in full. 
 
Generational aspects of conflict 
Sudanese children and adolescents in Australia usually live within a family structure, subject 
to the acculturative stresses of their parents as well as themselves. Parental control in this context is 
somewhat paradoxical, as it causes additional acculturation stress for adolescents, yet at the same 
time provides a sense of security and ethnic belonging (Dwairy, Achoui, Abouserie & Farah, 2006 in 
Poppitt and Frey, 2007). 
Like all parents, Sudanese and South Sudanese in the diaspora educate their children, 
passing on values, experience, as well as their narrative of life, and in this case conflict, to the next 
generation. This differs in nature from parent to parent, as what some view as irresponsible long 
distance nationalism, others justify as necessary freedom fighting (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006). Many 
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adolescent refugees have little experience of Sudan or South Sudan, having grown up in refugee 
camps or otherwise in exile, and their understanding of culture and connection with their homeland 
comes through relayed information and experience from parents and others in the community (Poppitt 
& Frey, 2007). Non-formal or Informal ethnic education for young migrants, where offered, seldom 
draws on a widely accepted curriculum or set of values, and the decision, whether conscious or 
unconscious, as to what attitudes and values will be conveyed to young people is largely at the 
teacher’s discretion (Cohen, 2004).  
In the case of refugees, who have undergone traumatic experiences and severe conditions in 
the home country, and often in transit and in the host country, significant grievances and fears are 
often passed on to following generations (Vorrath, 2012; Conversi, 2012). This trauma impacts the 
narrative of young refugees, and can perpetuate conflict within the broader diaspora. Conversely, it 
can also cause family or local conflict as trans-generational narratives and norms are met with 
resentment from young refugees, who are often more acculturated than their parents in the new 
society through their access to formalized schooling (Poppitt & Frey, 2007).  
 Westoby (2009) quotes a professional working with the South Sudanese diaspora in 
Australia: 
“A really major [factor] is the issue of family and children, children going along paths that they 
don’t want them to go on. They want them, the children, to hold in some holy reverential way, 
the past – and they want, from the children, a sense that the past and present pain has been 
worthwhile, and a thanking of their parents. This is the acknowledgement they want from the 
children – to be valued in that – and instead they are finding that the children are not valuing 
that and valuing instead parties, drugs and alcohol, and the peer group.” (Professional 
interview 1, Westoby, 2009. p.61) 
 
The relationship between parent and child in the diaspora is perhaps more complex than this 
account, however, with Poppitt and Frey’s (2007) research, also conducted in Queensland, Australia, 
finding Sudanese youth demonstrating protectiveness of their parents, through reluctance to answer 
questions about any topics that might provoke social judgment of their parents, such as in areas of 
discipline. Many adolescents also found that while they may not agree with the stricter family norms 
advocated by their parents, they also disagreed with seeming Australian norms, finding them overly 
disrespectful. Poppitt and Frey (2007) found the level of integration adolescents might achieve to be 
partly dependent on the allowances of their parents, a demonstration of the interdependent nature of 
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family wellbeing. Intergenerational learning, norms and acculturative differences are thus significant 
and complex factors in diaspora life, and conflict.  
 
Religion 
 Religious beliefs and practices provide a number of coping strategies commonly used by 
refugees from Africa (Khawaja & White et al 2008), and religion, usually Christianity, has proven a 
dominant avenue for women’s integration into Christian-majority societies and an important 
dimension of their understanding and experiencing of belonging (Benesova, 2004). This reveals an 
obvious potential cleavage between those of the dominant faith in the new host society, and those 
finding themselves in the minority – perhaps newly so. It begs the question as to the sense of 
belonging of non-Christians in Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas, and how this impacts 
diaspora dynamics. 
In the Egyptian context, for example, where we have already noted societal persecution of 
largely animist or Christian black African Sudanese groups, some Sudanese Muslims perceived 
church groups to be favoring Christians in their assistance (Moro, 2004). This perception may also 
extend to resettlement countries such as Australia, where Islam, and Muslim migration, has become 
the fear du jour, with anxiety about terrorism being associated with Muslims. Casimiro et al (2007) 
conducted research with Iraqi, Afghan and Sudanese Muslim women in Perth, Western Australia, 
finding that this group faced issues above and beyond those of other refugees based on their 
presence in ‘a host society that has become increasingly hostile to their form of religious expression 
and traditional lifestyle… an avowedly secularised society that has an intense mistrust of Islamic 
beliefs and practices’ (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.56). The Australian public has come to fear Muslim 
migration, in a politicized media context of terrorism discourse, ‘continuously replete with dominant 
stereotypes and negative attitudes towards refugees and Muslims, where Muslims are often labeled 
as ‘fanatics’ and ‘terrorists’ and refugees are ‘flooding our borders’ (Osuri and Banerjee, 2004; 
Yasmeen, 2001; Papastergiadis, 2004, in Casimiro et al, 2007 p.59). 
The Isma project of the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission found a 
significant number of Arab and Muslim Australians to be feeling fearful, isolated and vulnerable, with 
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a majority of respondents reporting prejudice that they had experienced because of their race or 
religion. Such experiences included both verbal and physical abuse, occurring in a wide array of 
public spaces such as schools, shopping centers, airports, hospitals, and within Australian 
government and non-government entities (AHREOC, 2004). The Commission’s 2003-4 Annual 
Report found that: 
Participants felt that those most at risk were readily identifiable as Arab or Muslim because of 
their dress, physical appearance or name, particularly Muslim women who wear the hijab. 
Arab and Muslim youth felt that they were particularly at risk of harassment which has led to 
feelings of frustration, alienation and a loss of confidence in themselves and their trust in 
authority. Many newly-arrived Arab or Muslim migrants and refugees reported that their 
experiences of prejudice have made it harder for them to negotiate the already difficult 
process of settling into a new country. (AHREOC, 2004 p.3) 
 
Thus in a religiously diverse diaspora, such as that of the Greater Sudanese which is largely 
separated into a Christian/Animist South and a Muslim North, differing interactions with, and levels of 
acceptance by, the host community increase the difference of experience and privilege, real or 
perceived, of groups of differing faiths. In Australia, 83% of Greater Sudanese individuals adhere to 
some form of Christianity, while 12% are Muslim (ADIC, 2007). This significant numerical imbalance 
between religious communities creates another opportunity for marginalization in this context of 
already unequal societal responses. 
 
Consequences of diaspora conflict 
Conflict in the diaspora has implications for the country of origin, the host community, and the 
individuals and diaspora community itself as, by definition, the diaspora maintains complex emotional, 
geographical, social or political relationships with each of these groups. Such conflict can encourage 
long distance nationalism that perpetuates conflicts through economic and political support or 
intervention without personal risk. As seen in Ethiopia, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Israel, Palestine and 
Kosovo, diaspora groups have been significant actors in augmenting and perpetuating conflicts 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Lyons 2004; Vertovec 2005, in Vorrath, 2012). Ethno-national mobilization 
can be perceived as necessary for maintaining threatened ethnic boundaries, with the diaspora 
supporting more dangerous and less peaceful approaches, and often far more radical than ‘natives’ 
when they engage in ‘homeland politics’ (Connor 1986; Kaiser 2004 in Conversi, 2012). This has 
	  	   18	  
been equated by some with reacting to guilt towards those left behind, or experiences of 
statelessness and marginalization in either home country, host country, or diaspora, facilitating the 
propagation of militant ideas among diasporas (Vorrath, 2012). 
The host community can be impacted as perceptions of Sudanese, or refugees, or broader 
conflicts may be skewed or misunderstood. Violence within the diaspora, such as that documented in 
Cairo impacts society beyond the diaspora. It is also open to politicization, as people use this violence 
as justification for disallowing refugee resettlement in their society (Westoby, 2009). Political lobbying 
by diverse and divergent groups with differing aims can also impact the actions and perceptions of 
the host country. This complex web of challenges faced by Greater Sudanese refugees, and its 
impact on their conflict internally and externally, demonstrates the importance of promoting 
multilayered dialogue between the diaspora and host community and also within the diaspora itself 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006). 
The diaspora itself is impacted by all of the above challenges, as essential relationships to 
the acculturative process are fractured, and additional trauma added to resettlement journeys. 
Through conflict in the areas of gender, identity, religious recognition and a multitude of other facts of 
life, the immensely traumatic refugee experience is compounded for the already diverse Sudanese 
and South Sudanese diasporas. The right to represent the diaspora, and routine perceived 
misrepresentation, is of paramount concern to diaspora members, and the potential consequence of 
perpetuating violence is evident. This all occurs largely in the absence of traditional conflict resolution 
structures, legitimate leadership or communal cohesion.  
 
Conflict Resolution 
As communities and individuals have moved from Sudan and South Sudan to the diaspora, 
their conflicts have changed. From initial land and agricultural conflict and blood feuds, ‘post conflict’ 
disputes have shifted focus to include also aspects of life such as traditional authority and family 
separation and reunification (Wassara, 2007). These social conflicts would traditionally be addressed 
by customary mediation, compensation or restitution in practices that differ greatly between Greater 
Sudanese cultural groups. Dinka and Nuer traditionally rely on mediation by elders, usually religious 
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persons, and require mutual consent in their processes. In Luo tradition, however, disputes would be 
handled by a king who would appoint a panel of judges to address the specific issue (Wassara, 
2007). Traditional institutions and social behavior have undergone radical change as the result of the 
ongoing conflict and displacement of the diaspora to new lands (Wassara, 2007), however, and 
diaspora groups are forced to determine their own conflict resolution mechanisms in an altered multi-
ethnic context, often in the absence of community cohesion, and usually in the absence of respected 
elders who are least able to make the long geographical journey of resettlement and may have been 
targeted in homeland conflict. The immediate capacity to resolve conflict that arises is thus 
significantly altered and diminished in this new diaspora context.  
 
Reconciliation and education 
 Reconciliation of conflict in the pluralistic and multilayered fractures of the diaspora is both 
necessary and thus far largely elusive. In approaching this notion, we should view the diaspora as a 
divided entity in itself, yet one that also exists as a distinct group within the host community, and one 
that relates to the country of origin. Thus there are three of Galtung’s theoretical centers: that within 
the resettled diaspora grouping; that of the host country; and that of the homeland. Individual and 
group actors in the diaspora may occupy differing roles in each that should be acknowledged if they 
are to be reconciled. 
 Reconciliation requires active transformation, deliberately building a new common outlook on 
the past. Some scholars have gone beyond this, arguing that the process of reconciliation should 
ultimately lead to collective forgiveness and healing. Forgiveness requires a decision to learn new 
truths about ourselves, in order to open a new perspective of our adversaries, reimaging them as 
human beings with equal rights. It requires an active reformation of the collective memory in order to 
develop an inclusive vision of the future that allows new positive relations with the ‘other’ (Bar-Tal & 
Rosen, 2009). The idea of reconciliation through education is not new, as Boyden and Ryder (1996) 
assert, conflict is the result of learned attitudes and learned behavior, thus it is possible to alter both 
attitudes and behavior through educational interventions (in Sommers, 2001). This requires, however, 
a shift in emphasis of evaluation of education system ‘success’ from the current dominant paradigm 
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of increased performance on international testing and league tables, toward a focus on minimizing 
social exclusion, promoting social cohesion and equipping students with the opportunities and 
abilities to actively participate in society with tolerance and respect for diversity, as put forth in Article 
29 on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Klasen, 2001). 
 With regard to reconciliation in the diaspora, its nature and removal from Greater Sudan 
positions it somewhat uniquely, balancing clear emotional, social and often political interaction with 
the homeland with geographic removal from it, and from each other. This means that standard 
mechanisms for retributive justice, for example, may not be as relevant or operationally possible 
given limits of jurisdiction and capacity – with the exception of course of those cases deemed 
significant enough to attract the attention of the International Criminal Court or governments. 
Likewise, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission may be unfeasible, as not all actors are present, 
and the communities that such models usually rely on have become fractured and dispersed. Such a 
commission may also promote a negative response from the host community, as individual admission 
of guilt in past conflicts may reinforce prejudice of violence amongst African communities, or be 
utilized politically as necessitating the end of humanitarian schemes. Thus neither of these 
commonplace post-conflict approaches is feasible for this nature of conflict in the diaspora, and 
alternative methods must be sought in order to promote peace and reconciliation in these 
communities. In accordance with Galtung’s (1971) conception of ‘structural violence’, this peace must 
be achieved not only through absence of physical conflict, but ‘cooperation and non-violent social 
change, aimed at creating more equitable and just structures in society’ (Hicks, 1988 in Sommers, 
2001 p.6). Formal, non-formal and informal forms of education create an opportunity to transform 
such structures and open new possibilities in the realm of social justice.  
 
Diaspora Educational Context 
 The educational context of the resettled Sudanese and South Sudanese diaspora is diverse, 
and educational opportunities and barriers for conflict transformation differ greatly between contexts. 
In Australia, as in the majority of other resettlement countries, refugee communities are dispersed, 
forming often numerically insignificant minorities in established mono- or multicultural communities.  
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 Impossible to ignore in the diaspora context is, of course, the rest of the host society. The 
Greater Sudanese diaspora does not operate in a vacuum, and is subject to the systems and 
structures of their new society. The success of any educational peace-building initiative thus relies not 
only on the diaspora itself, but also involves the rest of society. It is difficult to imagine sustainable 
conflict reduction, should systemic and social discrimination remain. 
I was standing in Coles. An Australian lady came close to me and called me ‘nigger – go 
back home’. I felt very bad. (Sudanese woman, 36 in Casimiro, 2007 p.66) 
 
 Education can be formal, non-formal or informal. These have varying definitions, and in this 
discussion we will adopt the distinction that Formal Education occurs through systematic, organized 
and deliberate presentation of content, for example, mandatory school-aged education undertaken in 
a classroom; Non-formal education occurs through those educational processes occurring outside 
formal structures, though still demonstrating deliberate educational content, for example some 
deliberate parent-child education, or self-guided homework; and Informal Education occurs 
throughout daily existence with no obligation on the student, or predetermined direct educational 
outcome, for example through the mass media, or the intergenerational learning between parent and 
child that is not deliberate in intention.  
 Much of what follows is an attempt to navigate formalized educational responses to largely 
informal social and systemic issues. Just as within the diaspora, intergenerational identity 
transmission and learning is also an important factor in the broader community, as perceptions about 
migrants, refugees, Africans, and Greater Sudanese individuals specifically are impacted and formed. 
The European Union’s 1988 Eurobarometer 30 Survey, found that older respondents, while not 
inherently more predisposed to prejudice, tended to display the key characteristics of lower 
education, more politically conservative views and national identity, that significantly increased their 
prejudice toward migrants (Pettigrew, 2007). In a country such as Australia with many holding living, 
and relatively recent, memory of the White Australia Immigration policy, such intergenerational 
learning may significantly promote prejudice.  
 Media portrayal of groups and selective news broadcasts is also key. The mass media is a 
particularly powerful educator. Whether we're talking about race or gender or class [or religion], 
popular culture is where the pedagogy is, it's where the learning is (bell hooks, 1997 p.2). Stuart Hall 
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(1997) has contributed much to this discussion of media representation, and specifically the 
relationship between cultural and economic power, and representation. Hall argues that meaning is 
given to situations by the deliberately constructed lens provided to us, building on dominant cultural 
conventions. This lens deliberately creates identification with or alienation from an image, creating the 
desired response. Repetition of images is very useful in creating automatic reactions to certain 
groups or situations. This is particularly important when considering stereotyping as it moves from 
conscious to unconscious reflexivity and can be very easily related to media images of refugees in 
the hyper-politicized Australian and European Union contexts. While other studies have found that 
exposure to one image is enough to create a lasting perception, repetition of biased depictions 
throughout film, television and advertising encourages an unthinking and unquestioning response. In 
this way representation of refugees and other groups in the media are not re-presenting what is in 
society, but rather moves beyond this, adopting dominant cultural frameworks to create the desired 
interpretation. Hall argues that the media creates the narrative, rather than reflecting it. The media 
thus dominates the determination and representation of societal acceptability, and conversely, of 
societal ‘otherness’. This ‘other’ space is that stereotypical realm occupied by migrants, particularly 
refugees, and others with low cultural capital who become subject to oversimplified negative 
depictions in the name of creativity, saving dominant groups from more complex discourse (Hall, 
1997). 
 Many Muslim refugees, for example, believe that increased prejudice against them is due to a 
lack of information, or misinformation, of the broader public. This extends to biased media portrayals 
and a lack of legal enforcement of protection from discrimination and vilification based on faith 
adherence (AHREOC, 2004). This both acknowledges the prejudice experienced by this, one of the 
fastest growing faith groups within the refugee community, and its systemic nature (Casimiro et al, 
2007). It is difficult to ignore the media’s importance in any educational proposition to reduce conflict 
in the diaspora. While we are focusing on the education of the diaspora, we must therefore also 
consider the education of the wider community and how this impacts peace and reconciliation for this 
group within their midst.  
 
	  	   23	  
Analysis: Three forms of Formal Education for Peace 
 For this analysis, three forms of education have been selected for discussion and 
comparison, with each offering potential for diaspora conflict mitigation through differing foci. The first 
form of education, Peace Education, focuses on individualized learning, and peace building through 
challenging and shifting of prejudice and associated behaviors through exposure to alternative 
narratives and cultural norms. The second form, Vocational Education, aims to reduce tensions by 
better equipping members of the Greater Sudanese diaspora to fully and meaningfully engage with 
the Australian workforce, through acquisition of appropriate skills and training. The third form of 
education, Community Development Programming, seeks to overcome diaspora conflict by 
generating and strengthening social structures and engagement between members of the diaspora, 
and between the diaspora and mainstream society. These three forms of education demonstrate very 
different approaches to diaspora conflict, recognizing the variety of contributing factors involved in 
such conflict, and differing schools of thought as to its transformation. 
 
Individual Alienation: Peace Education 
Introduction  
It is widely acknowledged in the field of post-conflict education that a smooth transition from 
social conflict to peace cannot reasonably be expected, and that some education, be it formal or role 
modeled, may be required. In refugee camps, such an approach has been adopted by international 
actors such as the UNHCR, UNESCO, Red Cross, and specialized education and peace-building 
NGOs. In the resettled diaspora, however, the common assumption is that refugees leave their 
conflict behind and that in traversing national boundaries and oceans, individuals and communities 
will somehow find peaceful living. As stated by a participant in Westoby’s (2009) study: 
It is very hard to be suddenly talking about none or no violence with a community that has 
lived in a context where violence is the only way of surviving. In war, violence is non-
negotiable, you survive through acts of violence, and then you arrive here and you have to 
change, in act non-violence is non-negotiable. And you have to make that change really 
quickly or suddenly the systems will have split your family up. Colonisation is a violent 
process, and it is felt in the body, the family, the community. How do we deal with that 
overnight? (Participant interview 7, Westoby, 2009 p.57) 
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 Acknowledging this, Peace Education programs have been adopted by a variety of 
organizations in the humanitarian field (Sommers, 2001), though these remain inadequate in capacity 
and coverage for the vast number of refugees generated by conflict, and are often limited to refugee 
camps. Once refugees are resettled it is usually assumed that their geographical removal from the 
conflicted homeland will suffice to overcome tensions, and further Peace Education is not provided. 
 
What is Peace Education? 
 Peace Education is a diverse, loosely structured term used in very different ways by different 
authors. Some use it interchangeably with Conflict Resolution Education. Others frame it as a subset 
of Multicultural Education, of vice versa. Peace itself is a vague and subjective concept, with 
connotations ranging from the inner spiritual, to the absence of fighting, to equality of opportunity. 
This has led to some confusion about the nature and goals of Peace Education as a field, with some 
feeling that it is too soft, vague, preachy, and perhaps even a waste of time (Sommers, 2001). The 
International Congress on Peace in the Minds of Men in 1989 created the concept of ‘a culture of 
peace’, based on universal values of respect for life, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights 
and gender equality (Korostelina, 2012). Although both focus on the realization of human rights, 
Peace Education can be seen as differing from Peace Building in that the former is just one of many 
tools to promote the latter. A commonality of Peace Education discourse, however, is an 
understanding that the goal is to change individuals’ behavior from conflict-oriented to peace-oriented 
(Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005). As articulated by Bar-Tal and Rosen (2009), Peace Education aims to 
actively and deliberately transform society members’ worldview, including their values, beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, motivations, skills, and patterns of behavior in order to facilitate conflict 
resolution, peace-building, and prepare individuals to live in an era of peace and reconciliation. 
 Peace Education initiatives vary considerably, and can be formal, informal or non-formal, as 
programs can be run in schools and community organizations; through the powerful tool of the mass 
media; or can focus on communal interventions that empower using local cultural understandings and 
practices.  
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The formal, school-based, approach to Peace Education as discussed here focuses efforts within the 
formal school system, viewing the school system as a major agent in socialization (Dreeben, 1968; 
Himmelweit & Swift, 1969 in Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009), with an individualized framework for learning. In 
recognition of the massive task of persuading the whole society of the importance of peacemaking, it 
focuses on this one agent, due to its power and influence. The education system is an obvious choice 
for such societal narrative changing, as it has the unique value of being compulsory in most societies, 
with a geographical and social reach across all segments of society. Schools possess the authority, 
legitimacy, resources, methods and conditions for Peace Education to occur, and predominantly 
educate children and youth who tend to be more open to new ideas and information than older 
generations, and at a time in their development that they are least affected by the dominating ethos. 
(Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009) 
 Peace Education, by some best practice models, moves beyond the advocacy sphere to 
teach not only what constructive behavior is, but also how to achieve it. Democratic learning styles 
and the ability to model, practice and take ownership of new behaviors are key. There have been 
some very successful Peace Education programs, for example those provided in partnership with the 
UNHCR. Sommers (2001) provided the following assessment the UNHCR program in the Kakuma 
and Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya:  
The strengths of the UNHCR Peace Education Programme are many. It promotes refugee 
empowerment and self-sufficiency. It appears to have been reasonably successful in bridging 
cultural gaps in Kakuma and Dadaab... Its practical orientation and objectives naturally and 
appropriately connect to the objectives and values inherent in refugee protection and 
education. The problem-solving skills it teaches have the potential to support both peaceful 
refugee repatriation and stable resettlement. It is also popular with refugees: a measure of its 
success lies in the fact that refugees in the programme not only continued but sometimes 
even expanded the programme during periods when UNHCR peace education personnel 
were not present. Finally, it is cost-effective. (p.37) 
 
 While values of tolerance, peace, acceptance, non-violence, and human rights are not 
objectionable to most societies, some of the requirements of formal Peace Education programs can 
create resistance to such programs outside of refugee camp contexts. Peace Education in schools 
requires major investment, as new educational objectives, new curricula and textbooks, teacher 
training, and the creation of a school climate that is conducive to peace education are all necessitated 
(Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). 
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Requirements for effective Peace Education in schools 
 Many, if not most, resettlement countries for Greater Sudanese diaspora would have the 
infrastructure and authority to meet educational conditions required for school-based Peace 
Education, however the societal conditions necessary for successful Peace Education in schools may 
not be so forthcoming – especially in a country that is not involved in the conflict itself. Bar-Tal & 
Rosen (2009) note that in conflict or post-conflict contexts, these should include evident broader 
progress towards peace; support for the peace process from the majority; readiness for reconciliation; 
and political support. However, in resettlement countries for the Greater Sudanese diaspora, these 
may not be relevant, sidelined instead by an ignorance that conflict is present at all.  
 A major consideration for formalized Peace Education, however, is leadership. As discussed 
previously, leadership in the diaspora is an immensely charged, and challenging, area, with 
significant implications for education. Determining who might make decisions about education, and 
how it might happen are far from simple. Capacity development of such leadership is thus essential, 
though with respect for the issues and limitations previously stated. Finding teachers within the 
diaspora community for Peace Education is the obvious preference, but then there is the potentially 
significant problem of the identity of such teachers, who despite good intentions, may ‘carry with them 
the legacy and habits of their lifetime membership in oppositional ethnic groups’ (Bekerman, 2009 
p.80). 
 If such programs are to succeed, the teacher must have the capacity and orientation to not 
only teach, but also personally uphold and demonstrate the knowledge, skills and attitudes 
associated with Peace Education (Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005). The formal curriculum structure of Peace 
Education in schools, as per the UNHCR model, uses rights-based learning as the key principle in 
designing the democratic and involved learning methodologies. To have sustained impact, these 
programs shouldn’t be ‘one off’, and should be structured, with activity-based, practical learning 
(Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005). 
 Selection of teachers also requires high levels of awareness and sensitivity, as discussed 
previously in relation to diaspora representation, as teacher training is in itself a form of 
empowerment. Sourcing from existing power structures, such as the educated males of the refugee 
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elite, rather than the most vulnerable and alienated, may further skew existing power dynamics, 
increasing marginalization and conflict between the diaspora’s power center and periphery 
(Sommers, 2001). 
 
The Issue of Exclusion 
 Alongside the above requirements, a significant criticism of Peace Education is its risk of 
becoming counter-productive if focused only on children and not their parents or families, given the 
demonstrated importance of intergenerational learning in families – particularly from parent to child 
(Sommers, 2001). 
 Formal education must always negotiate the issue of exclusion. The more formalized an 
interaction, thus the more reliant on structured physical participation, the more susceptible to program 
‘drop-outs’. This lack of involvement of ‘drop outs’, those disillusioned youth most at risk of 
marginalization, was noted in Kakuma, Kenya, though formalized education systems in Australia face 
a similar issue as disenfranchised students are pushed out of a system unable, or in some cases 
unwilling, to cater to them. This relates to a key criticism of the peace education field, which is noted 
for a tendency to aim programs at those already seeking peace (Sommers, 2001). This can serve to 
facilitate and magnify exclusion of the more marginalized individuals and groups, whose frustration 
may link with social, systemic and psychological isolation. The following three quotes from Kakuma 
youth interviewed by Sommers (2001) demonstrate these areas, the first eluding to social isolation or 
ostracization: 
They do nothing, they don’t have jobs, they are idle without anything. They are frustrated. 
Drop-outs can be robbers, in breweries. They are never allowed into [our] traditional dances. 
Peace education is for the most peaceful youth, not the Drop-outs, who are in the majority. 
(Sommers, 2001 p.28) 
 
The second to the economic isolation of poverty: 
 
Young men become Drop-outs, another youth commented, “due to frustration. Without food 
at home, with hunger, they can’t understand what they’ve learned [in school]”. (Sommers, 
2001 p.28) 
 
And the third referencing the isolating impact of psychological trauma: 
 
“Some people do not understand [Drop-outs], they are not well because they saw killing, 
looting, and so on during war, so they’re still disturbed.” (Sommers, 2001 p.28) 
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 These are all significant issues faced by refugees, and are extremely important to 
acknowledge and address if Peace Education is to positively impact communities. No one must be 
excluded from the dialogue of reconciliation, for it to be meaningful and sustainable. Thus in the 
resettled refugee context, Peace Education is made more difficult due to the number of excluded 
community members who are beyond the formal K-12 education system, and unable to meaningfully 
participate. Social exclusion among children is, after all, primarily associated with social exclusion and 
economic opportunities of the family in which they grow up (Klasen, 2001). Parents continue to 
demonstrate conflictive models while peace educators target such behavior in the child, thereby 
positioning Peace Education between children and adults and creating a situation where it is “virtually 
impossible for education to inculcate peaceful values in children when adult role models are built on 
conflict” (Boyden and Ryder, 1996, in Sommers, 2001). This may in turn create ‘a disjunction between 
values promoted at home and in school may cause anxiety and distress in children rather than 
optimism and peacebuilding’ (Sommers, 2001). 
 
Reinforcement of Divisions 
 Bekerman (2009), a critic of many multicultural and peace education initiatives, questions the 
validity of such education also because it can reinforce barriers between ethnicities, as in seeking to 
acknowledge differing groups, it disallows ambiguity and movement between them. Such 
categorization may serve to reinforce ethnic cleavages, as the focus falls on difference. This is both a 
valid criticism, and an understandable aspect of such programs, particularly in the area of children 
and youth multicultural education, where parents may hold significant fears about the nature of 
multiculturalism, and its implications for the identity of their child. A strong school of thought exists, 
particularly in the field of interfaith dialogue, that one cannot truly engage in dialogue in its complexity 
and multiplicity without first having a strong sense, and understanding, of ones own identity. 
 
Individualism 
 A key criticism of formalized Peace Education is its tendency toward individualism rather than 
acknowledging the important role of the group. This has been accused of perpetuating Western 
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cultural imperialism, and its biased conception of individual human rights (Sommers, 2001). 
Regardless of its origins, individualism as it is commonly framed in Western societies is a foreign 
concept to many others and it ignores or excludes the importance of communality and communal 
rights so fundamental to many cultures (Sommers, 2001). Because of this failure to recognize the role 
of the individual within the community – a relationship that has been demonstrated to be of key 
importance in both wellbeing and conflict, it may also make Peace Education less effective in many 
contexts, including that of the resettled Greater Sudanese Diaspora.  
 
Structural Alienation: Vocational Education 
Introduction 
 
 According to the World Health Organization, the most effective way to promote sustainable 
long-term peace is a commitment to social justice (Ekblad et al, 2004 p.328). This social justice 
sentiment relates to systemic justice and, at a basic level, the ability to participate meaningfully and 
appropriately in employment and economic life. It is increasingly recognized globally that overcoming 
basic threats to wellbeing, including poverty, literacy and insecurity, can diminish the likelihood of 
violent outbreaks in society (Ekblad et al, 2004), demonstrating the significance of practical 
empowerment of the Greater Sudanese diaspora in order to promote sustained peace. One of the 
key barriers to economic empowerment is education, whether vocational, ‘bridging’, or linguistic, and 
this will thus be explored as the second educational model for peace-building in the diaspora.  
 
What is Vocational Education? 
 Vocational education as discussed here, is that education which aims to impart skills and 
knowledge specific to a trade or career in order to prepare an individual to undertake skilled 
employment in a variety of areas. In many resettlement contexts, these are catered to through 
Vocational Education Training programs in schools, and/or equivalent programs post-compulsory 
schooling. ‘Bridging education’ in this context refers to the education necessary in order to be able, or 
allowed, to utilize skills learned overseas. An example of this would be a medical doctor who trained 
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elsewhere and requires additional coursework or examinations in order to be licensed to practice in 
the resettlement country. Many within the Sudanese diaspora arrive on humanitarian programs and 
may have experienced disrupted schooling, but this is not universal as some individuals already have 
significant professional and educational experience and their barrier is more administrative. This 
group has been known to experience greater distress with unemployment, as the greater disparity 
between the socio-economic levels pre- and post- resettlement is correlated with increased negative 
psychological outcomes (Aycan & Berry, 1996). Language ability has significant implications for 
individuals to access the above education, and thus adequate, accessible and appropriate language 
education is also an important element of this discussion.   
 Although also individually focused, this area of education and its various elements differs 
from Peace Education as it focuses on addressing conflict generated or exacerbated through 
systemic isolation as a result of unemployment or underemployment, and subsequent economic, 
social and mental health impacts. The focus is not on altering mindsets or teaching peaceful 
interaction, but rather seeks to address the inequality of opportunity within the diaspora and between 
the diaspora and broader society as one key facet of the ‘structural violence’ acknowledged by 
Galtung (1971). Hall & Kostic (2009) found that greater structural integration encourages a higher 
level of reconciliatory sentiment between groups within the former Yugoslav diaspora, lending 
practical weight to this area of education as a tool for peace building. 
 
Structural Inclusion 
 Structural, or systemic, inclusion in society is important for the wellbeing of individuals, and 
the community. Income is typically an important means for achieving this, as poverty is a strong 
exclusionary factor, though the importance of income is purely instrumental, while the importance of 
employment for social inclusion, societal participation and respect are intrinsically valuable (Klasen, 
2001). Individual economic security has been found to promote personal wellbeing, happiness and, 
importantly, tolerance, whilst at the same time benefiting economic growth (ILO, 2004). Employment 
also assists in protecting against mental health issues in refugee populations, as well as aiding in 
empowerment of individuals and communities through status and self-sufficiency, creating hope for 
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the future, positively strengthening individual identities, and human rights and dignity for the benefit of 
society (Ekblad et al, 2004).  
 Conversely, economic insecurity fosters what the International Labor Organization has 
termed "a world full of anxiety and anger" (ILO, 2004). The most important element in such economic 
insecurity is not the level of income, or even increase in income, but rather the level of income 
security, evidenced by income protection levels and inequality (ILO, 2004). This is key for members of 
the Greater Sudanese diaspora, as they navigate life in a new host society, often with interrupted 
formal schooling, and occupy unskilled labor positions with less job security. Their disempowered 
status positions them in the above-mentioned world of anxiety and anger, likely inflaming tensions.  
In general, immigrants and minorities lag behind natives and the majority populations in 
economic, educational, social and political areas. They tend to have higher unemployment 
rates, lower occupational attainment and wages, a looser labor market attachment, and are 
least able to find and hold good jobs. Worse, mobility remains slow or nonexistent across 
generations. (Constant et al, 2009 p.6) 
 
 In Australia’s segmented labor market, African migrants are allocated low status jobs, 
regardless of their prior skills and training (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury 2006, 2007; Fozdar and 
Torezani 2008 in Marlowe, 2010). The 2006 Australian Census showed the average weekly income 
for the Sudanese diaspora was $231, less than half that of the $488 earned by Australian born 
individuals (Marlowe, 2010). Appropriate employment is thus of great importance to this community. 
 
Structural Inclusion for peace 
 Hall and Kostic’s (2009) research findings argue that empowerment of diasporas through 
structural integration provides the psychological coherence required to reconcile the past and 
envision a common future with other groups. They base their assessment on citizenship, language 
training, education and employment. Given the educational context of this discussion, focus will be 
restricted to the latter three. Hall and Kostic’s (2009) study focused on reconciliatory attitudes of 
Bosnians, Croats, Serbs and Yugoslavs in Sweden, testing the effects of social and structural 
integration on attitudes towards, among other things, forgiveness and prospects for peaceful 
coexistence. Their theory is drawn from the fields of health psychology and sociology. In such fields, 
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unemployment, in particular, has been associated with a range of negative consequences of 
individual wellbeing.  
 Findings showed that greater structural integration encourages a higher level of reconciliatory 
sentiment between groups within the diaspora (Hall and Kostic, 2009). Higher structural integration 
led to a decrease in ethnocentrism and a higher level of positivity towards cultures and traditions of 
other ethnic groups within the same diaspora. Importantly, these structurally integrated diaspora 
members were more likely to acknowledge the past suffering of others in their conflict, be more 
forgiving of past persecution committed against their group, less likely to justify the concept of ethnic 
cleansing, and overall more optimistic towards future prospects for coexistence of differing groups 
within the diaspora of the former Yugoslavia (Hall and Kostic, 2009). 
 These findings lend significant weight to the argument for diaspora peace-building through 
systemic integration, offering educational opportunities in the areas of skills and training – whether 
vocational, bridging, or linguistic. Reasoning for this draws on the theory that ‘structural integration, 
through the mechanism of a higher sense of coherence (SOC) empowers diasporas to process and 
contextualize war-related experiences and make sense of daily life, and to deal with the new 
challenges they face in the hostland environment’ (Hall and Kostic, 2009 p.8). 
As mentioned above, employment has importance for the individual beyond providing 
income, including contribution to a sense of purpose in life, defining status and identity, and enabling 
relationships with others in the society (Jahoda, 1982, in Aycan and Berry, 1996), all of these of 
particular importance to refugees as a vulnerable and systemically ostracized group.  
 
Barriers to Structural Inclusion 
Aycan and Berry (1996) researched barriers to migrant integration into the Canadian 
workforce, and found that language competence, a lack of recognition of credentials and a lack of 
local work experience proved the most significant barriers. Constant et al (2009) echo this, adding 
also the differing social, cultural, and religious norms originating from within the respective ethnic 
minority. Whilst this research was not specific to refugees, it demonstrates also that employment-
related adversity such as status loss, and unemployment or underemployment, impacts negatively on 
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the psychological wellbeing of migrants, increasing acculturative stress, negative self-concept and 
societal alienation as well as negatively impacting the capacity of migrants to adapt to their new host 
society (Aycan and Berry, 1996). Acculturative stress is associated with depression, due to loss, and 
anxiety, due to uncertainty. Employment issues, including unemployment and underemployment, and 
associated low socio-economic status increase depressive symptoms and stress of migrants (Aycan 
and Berry, 1996). 
Alienation is likely to occur when there is a discrepancy between the desired state that the 
society values as the norm (e.g., having a decent job), and the achieved state (e.g., 
unemployment or underemployment) that is characterized by a failure to meet the societal 
norms and expectations (Kanungo, 1979 in Aycan and Berry, 1996 p.242) 
 
Gang et al. (2002) reported that those in the center of society: young people, the more highly 
educated and skilled demonstrated more favorable sentiment toward ethnic minorities and 
immigrants, while those on the periphery, such as the permanently sick or disabled, disillusioned 
workers, unemployed individuals and retirees held more hostile attitudes (in Constant et al, 2009). 
Hostility in reaction to competition between refugees and those most vulnerable and in society is 
unsurprising as these groups compete most directly for economic and social inclusion from the most 
unstable positions, and thus perhaps are the least empathetic with each others’ plight.  
 
Language Ability 
 In the Australian context, English language proficiency has a direct impact on the ability of 
migrants to adapt socially and economically to their new context, and the duration of such adaptation 
(Stewart and Nam Do, 2003; Rida and Milton, 2001, in Casimiro et al, 2007). Despite government 
efforts, current offerings do not adequately meet the needs of refugees. Those who already speak 
English before arrival are able to settle more easily, noting the ‘tremendous effect’ that being able to 
speak English had in allowing them to find employment, access services and attend educational 
training’ (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.60).  
 Conversely, a lack of English leads to isolation and difficulties in the acculturation process. 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of Sudanese arrive in Australia with limited or no English, as 
demonstrated by Casimiro et al’s (2007) survey of refugee women. Parts of Sudan have experienced 
conflict and significant upheaval for decades. Most refugees from Sudan and South Sudan have thus 
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experienced immense disruption to their education as they transit through refugee camps and other 
temporary settlements – often for many years at a time. One impact of this is that many recent 
arrivals may never have experienced formal education and may struggle with literacy in their first 
language (Casimiro et al). Beyond this, members of this diaspora arriving in Australia are unlikely to 
have extensive, if any, knowledge of English. Sudanese women surveyed viewed this insufficient 
knowledge of English as a major barrier to employment, with one stating: 
If you don’t speak English, It’s like being in a cage – you are like a bird with no wings... I felt 
like a child not able to speak and communicate with people. Employers don’t even consider 
you – even if the job doesn’t require knowledge of reading and writing in English, such as a 
commercial cleaner. (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.61). 
 
Another Sudanese woman stated: 
When I came here I experienced loneliness and depression. Language was the biggest 
problem for me to blend into the Australian society. My children have absorbed the language 
very quickly because they are young and at school. But for me, I am at home and need more 
help and effort in order for me to learn the language, as well as get work. They [the 
Government] should provide work for people who can’t speak the language because we 
really need to work to blend into the Australian society and support our families not only here 
but family overseas. (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.61). 
 
The Australian government provides access to 510 hours of English language classes for 
refugees, usually through the Adult Migrant English Program. Like others internationally, this program 
has been criticized due to long waiting periods, a lack of knowledge of class options, insufficient 
hours of formal learning, the mixed academic level of classes, childcare concerns and the mixing of 
genders and ethnicities within classes (Casimiro et al, 2007). Language courses provided to migrants 
also often lack coverage of technical language for the workplace, further limiting their capacity to 
enter elements of the workforce (Thomas, 1992, in Aycan and Berry, 1996). The ability to access 
adequate education to enable interaction in the resettlement country language is thus an immensely 
powerful factor for this diaspora, with outcomes clearly delineating between those with and without 
this developed language ability with deeply divergent social, psychological and economic outcomes.  
 
Discrimination in the workforce 
 Individual skills attainment alone may not suffice in decreasing structural violence within and 
against the Greater Sudanese diaspora, due to the broader issue of discrimination in the workforces 
of many resettlement societies. In 2007, the IZA Expert Opinion Survey (Zimmermann et al, 2007) 
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was conducted among expert stakeholders in the EU and reported the majority of respondents 
perceived ethnic minorities to be exposed to either “high” or “very high” risk of labor market exclusion 
in that context, with 81 percent of all respondents and 91 percent of minority respondents believing 
this risk of exclusion to be either constant or increasing (in Constant et al, 2009). Experts consulted 
suggested, among other strategies, a number of educational means such as targeted pre-school 
education and information campaigns, self-confidence development programs, active lobbying, 
cultural diversity education, recognition of foreign educational documents and media management to 
promote the benefits of immigrants and challenge racism in the media (Constant et al, 2009). 
 Twenty out of the thirty-four Sudanese women surveyed by Casimiro et al (2007) in Australia 
echoed this, reporting experiencing racism wither whilst attempting to attain work or at work once 
employed. A Sudanese woman noted: 
I am working as a nurse assistant. I feel fortunate to be working because many of my 
Sudanese friends have no jobs. Employers always ask us if we have Australian 
experience...At work, the white Australian nurses give me the heaviest and messiest duties to 
do. Some talk down to me and others just don’t take notice of me and ignore me. It makes 
me mad, it is demeaning, yet I cannot say anything. (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.63) 
 
 Beyond individual concerns, this has significant implications at a communal level, as those 
suffering from structural exclusion, whether through educational, linguistic, or discriminatory means, 
have less stake in the existing order. As such, they are less likely to seek to uphold that order, instead 
engaging in anti-social behavior. Without wishing to delve too deeply into this highly stigmatized area, 
data does support the connection between the dynamics of unemployment, systemic violence through 
poverty, social effects, and some forms of criminal behavior (Klasen, 2001). 
 Given the risk posed by potential conflict repetition through erosion of social supports and 
intergenerational transmission, addressing intra- and inter-community reconciliation through a 
systemic approach to peace building through employment is highly plausible at an individual level, but 
alongside this, broader steps to address racism and discrimination are clearly required. 
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Social Alienation: Community Development Programs 
Introduction  
 Social identity has many functions, both cognitive and emotional, and directly influences self-
esteem and many other aspects of self-identity. Individual self-esteem is elevated or lowered in part 
due to broader social perception and regard for the performance and status of not only ourselves, but 
our membership groups (Pettigrew, 2007). In the event of societal breakdown, people often revert to 
exclusionary ethnic or confessional identities even in previously cohesive environments (Zartman, 
2007 in Neumann & Emmer, 2012). In situations such as that of the Greater Sudanese diaspora, 
where conflict occurs between groups, neighbors, individuals, within families and communities, the 
population becomes divided by affiliations, as everybody becomes implicated in the conflict, often 
simultaneously as both victim and offender, leading to segregation that complicates the possibility of 
reconciliation (Neumann & Emmer, 2012 p). This physical and social removal and alienation from 
other parts of the diaspora community negatively impacts individual coping strategies as well as the 
possibility for reconciliation as a society. 
 The strong social emphasis of Silove’s (1999) five adaptive systems allows some insight into 
the current and desired context of post-conflict refugees: 1. Interpersonal bonds; 2. Security and 
safety; 3. Social framework that promotes new identities and roles; 4. Respect for human rights and 
social justice; 5. Respect for the individual need to belong to religious, spiritual, political or social 
groups (in Ekblad et al, 2004). Amartya Sen’s (1992, 1999) Capability Approach complements this, 
calling for equality of access to basic capabilities including basic physical necessities alongside the 
basic social necessities of community integration, participation in community and public life, and the 
enjoyment of social bases of self respect (in Klasen, 2001). Such a rights-based approach to this 
issue ‘emphasizes that the inability to participate in, and be respected by, mainstream society is a 
violation of a basic right that should be open to all citizens (or residents)’ (Klasen, 2001 p.415), while 
encouraging society to take responsibility for integration of members, leaving less temptation to 
blame the excluded for their position. ‘[I]t highlights the central role political, economic and social 
structures play in exclusion and the role of communal solidarity in overcoming it’ (Townsend, 1997 in 
Klasen, 2001 p.415). Social connection is thus key to inclusion in society as individuals come 
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together in mutual support. In the case of the Greater Sudanese diaspora with its fractured social 
context, such communal solidarity cannot simply be assumed. 
 
What are Community Development Programs? 
 Community Development Programs seek to decrease social distance between and within 
groups, providing a common network of dialogue and support. Communal trust is essential for 
democracy and non-violence (Newton, 2007 in Neumann & Emmer, 2012). Interpersonal forms of 
communication between antagonized groups is thus an essential precondition to such trust and 
understanding, as interaction encourages, and at some point requires, reinterpretation of social 
narratives, transforming prejudice and re-humanizing enemies (Neumann & Emmer, 2012). Like 
structural exclusion, social exclusion generates threats to society through crime and violence, as well 
as creating and exacerbating societal divisions, racism, xenophobia and systemically undermining 
behavior from excluded elements (Klasen, 2001). In the case of the resettled Greater Sudanese 
community, this may mean increased racism and violence within the diaspora, or between the 
diaspora and disenfranchised members of the host society as locals target their perceived competitor. 
 
Social Inclusion and Exclusion 
 Social inclusion is an important factor in stability and peace-building in the diaspora. Bar-Tal 
and Rosen (2009) explain the existence and maintenance of communal conflict as derived from an 
evolved culture of conflict that is dominated by societal beliefs, collective memory and an ethos of 
conflict. This ethos of conflict provides meaning for conflicting groups, directing current actions and 
future goals. Such narratives are selective, biased, and distorted as they seek to justify rather than 
provide an objective account of the reality (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Social fragmentation as in the 
Greater Sudanese diaspora maintains such distortions, offering little opportunity for mutual 
understanding. To focus initially on the role of group-aligned social cleavages, Tajfel (1982) states 
that: 
Two types of theory are required to explain the state of ethnic group relations in a society. 
One must be a theory of intergroup behavior, sociological in orientation and using for its 
evidence materials that are primarily historical. The other theory is social psychological. Its 
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concern is primarily cognitive factors and the relations of these factors with the interpersonal 
behavior of individuals (p.2) 
 
 Social exclusion is an immense issue facing societies globally, increasingly recognized as 
discourse broadens from traditional notions of exclusion through income poverty, which fails to 
adequately acknowledge the multilayers and immense disadvantages faced by some groups (Klasen, 
2001). These layers of disadvantage concern the Greater Sudanese diaspora as individuals and 
communities struggle to navigate not only the reasons for social exclusion, such as language and 
economic means, but are also subject to the negative flow-on effects of such exclusion communally, 
psychologically and inter-generationally. However, in the same way communication is used to 
escalate conflict it can be used to de-escalate and transform conflict even under challenging 
circumstances (Neumann & Emmer, 2012) 
 
Intergroup Dialogue 
 Intergroup dialogue through structured Community Development Programs is a key, and 
popular, avenue for pursuing the transformation of social exclusion, and build social cohesion, as 
research has recognized that positive, face-to-face intergroup contact helps moderate out-group 
prejudice (Pettigrew, 2007). Dessel et al (2006) provide a definition of intergroup dialogue as ‘a public 
process designed to involve individuals and groups in an exploration of societal issues such as 
politics, racism, religion, and culture that are often flashpoints for polarization and social conflict’ 
(p.303). Such dialogue can be immensely powerful in achieving personal and communal conflict 
transformation, providing a communal safe space to express remorse, anger and frustration about 
injustice, and power, and where cultural issues and other divisive issues can be addressed 
constructively (Agbaria & Cohen, 2002 in Dessel et al, 2006).  
 Jürgen Habermas’ theoretical line dictates that community level cooperation between identity 
groups is essential to stabilizing peace and communal wellbeing. This requires the establishment of 
formal communication structures to enable interaction and discussion even in areas of disagreement. 
Acceptance of such structures requires them to be rooted in the community, and thus developed by 
the stakeholders themselves (in Neumann & Emmer, 2012). The UNESCO Medium Term Strategy for 
1996-2001 encouraged that a ‘culture of peace should be built on dialogue, mediation, and 
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recognition of equality and dignity for every state, group, and person. It suggests the development of 
a global identity that rests both on local identities and a global solidarity against common threats to 
the planet’ (Korostelina, 2012 p.1). 
 The intergroup dialogue process is designed to be inclusive, collectively exploring contentious 
social issues that contribute to conflict in the diaspora. Through witnessing, and engaging in such 
discussions new communication and listening skills are learned and modeled, and shared meanings 
sought toward an inspired and optimistic future (Chasin et al, 1996 in Dessel et al, 2006). 
‘Participants are asked to suspend assumptions, confirm their unfamiliarity with each other, be 
spontaneous, and prepare for unanticipated consequences. They are encouraged to collaborate 
willingly, be vulnerable, and believe in the authenticity of all participants’ (Cissna and Anderson, 2002 
in Dessel at al, 2006.) It is not what is communicated in some precise narrative truth that is healing, 
but the invitation to share because pain itself is not something purely private (Humphrey, 2002 in 
Westoby, 2009). 
 
Outcomes of Community Development Programs 
 
 The individual and societal benefits of such interpersonal education and transformation are 
immense. An inclusive group perspective can minimize prejudice and the desire for violence, as 
demonstrated in the European Union. The GMF02 study in 2002 surveyed respondents in Germany 
and found that those displaying the highest level of nationalist connection in their identity were more 
prejudiced against foreigners, more anti-Semitic and more favorable toward violence. By contrast, 
those who identified more universally as a member of the European Union were less prejudiced 
against foreigners, Jews and less condoning of violence (Pettigrew, 2007). Community Development 
Programming, involving intergroup dialogue, endeavors to promote such collective identity, and such 
associated steps in prejudice reduction.  
 Intergroup dialogue environments seek to foster willingness and respect for sharing, and 
potentially threatening acknowledgement of the contribution of history as well as the present in 
conflict, thus factors such as the nature of facilitation, and choice of location for meeting are highly 
relevant to the outcome (Dessel et al, 2006). Such a structure must: Create an environment where 
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ideal speech situations are encouraged; Provide a shared framework for interaction, that mediates 
between perceived competing narratives and build individual trust; Lead to the establishment of 
grassroots institutional structures at a local level to enable maintenance of communication throughout 
situations of conflict (Neumann & Emmer, 2012). Enabling such spaces can be highly complex in a 
group such as the greater Sudanese diaspora, wherein ethnic and identity groups endeavor to adapt 
to their new context, including a new relative power context. Assumptions of symmetry between the 
communication partners are challenged in identity conflicts, where groups can experience 
significantly differing power levels both numerically and socially (Neumann & Emmer, 2012). 
 Westoby (2009) proposes a social model for healing within this diaspora, following his 
identification that the trauma experienced is primarily social in nature. He finds that this significant 
wounding has included disruption to culture and collective agency, the rupturing of interpersonal and 
communal relationships, exacerbated by injuries of structural suffering. In response to this, he puts 
forth the social resources for healing as culture, community and power through social processes that 
build connections, and reduce conflict within and between the Sudanese diaspora community and 
others.  
[This] provides ample evidence that any resources of culture, community and power have 
been impacted upon by the social process of violence, forced migration and resettlement. 
Hence, any intervention needs to be based on eliciting, again through dialogue, refugee 
collective agency to make sense of their agonistic new location in a resettlement context such 
as Australia. (Westoby, 2009 p.87) 
 
 Through strengthening such communal ties, local capacity is strengthened to resist 
manipulation and to respond positively on behalf of the entire community, regardless of its divisions 
(ACORD, 2009). 
 
ACORD: Community Social Peace and Recovery Model 
 The Community Social Peace and Recovery Model used by ACORD uses community-driven 
dialogue to analyze underlying causes of conflict, begin healing, and encourage collective leadership 
in working towards a peaceful future with negotiated commitments for cohabitation and community-
based recovery (ACORD, 2009). The model involves five interwoven elements of reconciliation: 
developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society; acknowledging and dealing with the 
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past; building positive relationships; significant cultural and attitudinal change: and substantial social, 
economic and political change (ACORD, 2009). Changes in the ways people relate to and perceive 
each other are key, as developed cultures of suspicion, fear, mistrust and violence are broken down, 
opening space in which people can both listen and feel that they are heard, nurturing respect for 
human rights and human difference, providing for a context where individuals are more active 
participants in society, with a greater sense of invested belonging (ACORD, 2009).  
 Following the logic argument that if social fracturing is the issue, it can also be the solution, this 
program framework also includes the communal creation and formation of Community Watchdogs 
within the community itself, which oversee grassroots implementation of community social peace 
contracts and encourage individuals to maintain their commitment to peaceful cohabitation, as has 
been successfully used throughout Africa, including in Sudan (ACORD, 2009). 
 
Community Development and Individual Wellbeing 
 Another aspect of Community Development, beyond conflict mitigation and resolution, is 
individual wellbeing. Goodman (2004) found that Sudanese youth primarily used collectivity and 
communal self as a way of coping (Khawaja et al, 2008). A study of the trauma coping mechanisms 
employed by Sudanese refugees in Brisbane, Australia echoed this in part, finding two of the 
dominant mechanisms to be faith and social networks (Khawaja et al, 2008). Both of these are 
socially relevant, as religious communities contribute to refugee social connection, and sense of 
wellbeing. Refugees also reported praying to get through difficult situations, and relying on their trust 
in God to find the strength to continue.  Professed faith adherence has been found to be positively 
correlated with the crucial coping strategies of hope, endurance, resourcefulness, and in the 
structural realm of educational attainment, language ability and lower PTSD. This is consistent with a 
study in US south that found the church community to be central to refugee healing and sense of 
belonging. This causes some concern in the case of minority faiths, as they may not have adequate 
access to holy sites or meet with societal hostility, as previously discussed. Religious adherence, as a 
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specific subset of social engagement, is a key coping strategy common throughout much of Africa 
(Khawaja et al, 2008). 
 Social support has been found to act as a protective factor against the impact of violence and 
persecution, as families and communities provide emotional support to the individual (McMichael and 
Manderson, 2004, in Khawaja et al, 2008). The social focus of Community Dialogue programs implies 
that ‘the sociality of healing includes processes of re-building a social fabric within a refugee social 
body, and at the same time weaving a new social fabric between the refugee social body and the host 
society’s social body’ (Westoby, 2009 p.90). 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The resettled Greater Sudanese diaspora experiences complex conflicts in a myriad of ways. 
These range from gender to identity to intergenerational and religious. Some are dependent on 
interactions with the host country, others the homeland, and others occur solely within the diaspora 
itself. 
 Building on a Capacity Development approach, which seeks to enable and facilitate 
application of existing capacity, it is clear that any framework for assistance should be created 
collaboratively at all levels, promoting learning exchange and capacity development of diaspora 
communities in a ‘bottom-up-top-down’ approach’ wherein individuals are considered ‘responsible co-
creators’ involved in joint problem solving and creative, collaborative development rather than 
recipients of an intervention (Ekblad et al, 2004). 
 
 Peace Education is an obvious inclusion in this discussion of differing educational models as 
opportunities for transforming conflict within the Greater Sudanese diaspora, with its direct focus on 
reframing mindsets and altering prejudice toward a peaceful coexistence. One significant 
consideration for this method in a resettlement context, however, is whether Peace Education is itself 
an inclusive or exclusive program within broader society. An exclusive approach would include only 
members of the diaspora, whilst an inclusive approach would involve broader society alongside the 
diaspora, seeking to include all children in the formal K-12 schooling system. Excluding society, and 
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including only the Sudanese diaspora in this education may decrease hostility within that group, 
simultaneously building a common external ‘other’ that is the broader society. This is also unhelpful. 
But if all of society’s children are included in the Peace Education program, it should be considered 
whether the program could maintain its relevance for those within the nuanced and complex social 
conflict dynamics of the Sudanese diaspora, or if this might be lost in the broadening process of 
inclusion. 
 Structural integration through vocational, bridging and language education is another way to 
address conflict, without focusing on, or delineating, identity or history. The focus instead is on 
allowing individuals the opportunity to develop greater autonomy through economic integration, in this 
instance assisting Greater Sudanese diaspora members to enter and progress in the workforce, 
along with associated positive psychological impacts and coping mechanisms. This reliance on 
economic integration, with its flow-on effects to broader social connection and self-esteem raises 
highly disputed questions in the field of migration studies, of integration versus multiculturalism – 
emphasizing either the host society, or the migrant community, as the most significant potential 
source of support. This model perhaps warrants similar criticism to Peace Education, in its 
individualized focus. Beyond attempting to ensure equal access to employment opportunity 
throughout the diaspora, it otherwise ignores this microcosm of community within which Sudanese 
migrants operate. Structural integration through employment has no aim to specifically build the 
capacity of this group, focusing instead only on the individual. This may be less appropriate for 
Greater Sudanese cultural groups that have been demonstrated to strongly uphold community and 
communal identity. 
 Community Development Programs take a communal approach to conflict resolution, relying 
on improved social interaction and mechanisms to improve issues of social dislocation. This appears 
highly congruent with the cultures present in the Sudanese diaspora. This model does, however, also 
face risks that activists and community workers focus only on the diaspora, potentially alienating the 
rest of the community. A sole focus on building the diaspora capacity whilst ignoring a surrounding 
societal environment that has been demonstrated to be hostile to such groups and individuals is 
surely limited in its potential positive impact, if not counter-productive.  
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 In acknowledging the importance of externalities, it is prudent to note the exacerbating impact 
these externalities have on diaspora conflict, and yet also acknowledge that this is not the sole factor 
– that diaspora conflict also occurs in separation from broader society. Historical animosities and 
asymmetrical acculturation conflict may be generated by migration conditions, though they do not 
result solely from interaction with host society itself. Thus, whilst it is an important factor, if we 
eliminated the external racism, there is no evidence that this would solve the problem of conflict in the 
diaspora. It must thus be decided which is more important for Community Development Programs - 
diaspora community building, or integration with the local community. Given this evidence, an obvious 
answer would be ‘both’. Issues exclusive to the diaspora that promote or provoke conflict must be 
adequately addressed, and broader societal issues of racism and stigmatization should also be 
acknowledged and addressed if the diaspora is to be afforded equal access to structural and social 
inclusion. 
 
 Each of these three models has been demonstrated to provide an opportunity for peace-
building within the Sudanese diaspora context: One through deliberate and structured broadening of 
perspectives; one through increased economic participation in society; and one through increased 
social engagement. Each of these is also impacted by perceptions and prejudices held by wider 
society, and all would benefit from awareness raising and counter-racism campaigns at a broader 
societal level. In assessing the validity and potential of the three educational foci: Individualized 
Peace Education; Systemic Integration; and Social Integration, the question should be asked: if this 
were the only educational opportunity, would it in itself transform hostilities?  
 
 The individualized nature of vocational education means that whilst mindsets might well be 
changed, the outcome is highly dependent on circumstances to be successful, as ongoing economic 
participation is required for such positive attitudinal responses to be upheld. Likewise, the nature of 
classroom Peace Education makes it dependent on willingness and capacity to deliver such 
education, based on the teacher-student model, without which it lacks use as it is not well-adapted to 
self-learning, and has not demonstrated its sustainability beyond target communities and formal 
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programs. It is structurally reliant. For both of these models this is a significant disadvantage, as the 
threat to fracture is increased through this external reliance as diaspora members find themselves 
subject to broader actors of the economy and schooling systems.  
 Comparatively, Community Development Programs through dialogue offer potentially robust 
alternatives, reinforced by communal investment to withstand the ebbs and flows of existence, 
empowering the diaspora community itself to navigate conflict, both current and future, should it 
emerge. The other two forms of education are in themselves very useful, and should not be 
discounted for their importance and potential impact on the diaspora, however it is through grassroots 
dialogue and community building that people will be able to communicate their needs, discuss issues 
of concern such as gender norms, offer healing to each other for past and present trauma, and 
collectively build resilient capacity to address the challenges of the future. 
 
 Education is a powerful force in conflict. This happens formally, through systematic, 
organized and deliberate presentation of content; non-formally, through those educational processes 
occurring outside formal structures, though still demonstrating deliberate educational content; and 
informally, as education occurs throughout daily existence with no obligation on the student, or 
predetermined direct educational outcome. None of the educational approaches presented here 
offers certainty in conflict resolution, nor do they have the capacity to independently achieve holistic 
conflict transformation. Yet each of these three educational areas: Peace Education, Vocational 
Education, and Community Development Programming have been demonstrated to hold significant 
value in decreasing the potential for diaspora conflict. The potential impact of education in all these 
forms on the process of reconciliation is immense, as its immense capacity to modify mindsets, 
promote inclusion and enable social justice are clearly evident. In the case of the Greater Sudanese 
diaspora, such educational initiatives offer significant peace-building opportunities to traumatized 
individuals and fractured and disempowered communities.  
 Mother Teresa famously said, ‘If we have no peace, it is because we have forgotten that we 
belong to each other.’ Education offers us the re-discovery of this interconnectedness, structurally, 
socially and in our humanity. It provides the conditions to allow members of the Greater Sudanese 
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diaspora to recognize anew their common belonging as people, and as migrants, and it allows 
resettlement societies to take steps toward meaningfully including, and celebrating, this group within 
their midst.  
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